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Abstract
In An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is1 Graham Priest presents
branching rules in Free Logic, Variable Domain Modal Logic, and Intuitionist Logic. I
propose a simpler, non-branching rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instantiation
in Free Logic, a second, slightly modified version of this rule to replace Priest’s rule for
universal instantiation in Variable Domain Modal Logic, and third and fourth rules,
further modifying the second rule, to replace Priest’s branching universal and particular
instantiation rules in Intuitionist Logic. In each of these logics the proposed rule leads
to tableaux with fewer branches. In Intuitionist logic, the proposed rules allow for the
resolution of a particular problem Priest is grappling with throughout the chapter. In
this paper, I demonstrate that the proposed rules can greatly simplify tableaux and
argue that they should be used in place of the rules given by Priest.
1 Introduction
In Chapter 13 of An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is Graham Priest
(2008) introduces the following rule for universal instantiation in Free Logic:
∀xA
↙↘
¬Ea Ax(a)
In this rule, a is any constant already on the branch; if there is no constant already on the
branch, one is introduced. Priest slightly adapts this rule to suit Variable Domain Modal
Logic in Chapter 15 and to suit Intuitionist Logic in Chapter 20.
1As the aim of this paper is to present improved quantifier rules for various systems of logic presented
in Priest (2008), I will adopt much of his terminology, notation, and formatting. For straightforward
comparison with the text, citations will follow Priest’s formatting of (x, y, z) with x denoting the chapter,
y the section, and the z the subsection, rather than providing page numbers.
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I propose a simpler rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instantiation in Free Logic,
a second, slightly modified version of this rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instan-
tiation in Variable Domain Modal Logic, and third and fourth rules, further modifying the
second rule, to replace Priest’s branching universal and particular instantiation rules in
Intuitionist Logic.
In essence, each of these rules replaces a branching rule that indicates a formula of
the form ∀xA is true when either ¬Ea is true or A is true of any other object with a
non-branching rule that is applied only when there is an object said to exist on the branch.
This idea is applied across the instances of similarly branching rules in Priest’s chapters on
Free Logic, Variable Domain Modal Logic, and Intuitionist Logic. In each of these logics
the proposed rule leads to simpler tableaux. In Intuitionist logic, the proposed rules allow
for the resolution of a particular problem Priest grapples with throughout the chapter: a
desire that resulting tableaux be both perspicuous and not unwieldy.
In each of the following three sections I begin by introducing a system of logic, includ-
ing presenting Priest’s universal and particular instantiation rules for the system. I then
complete a tableau that closes with Priest’s rule. After completion of the closed tableau,
I explain the rule I propose and complete the previous example with the proposed rule
replacing Priest’s rule. I will follow this by completing an example that does not close with
Priest’s rule and generating a countermodel from the open tableau. Then, I complete the
previous open tableau and generate a counterexample with the proposed rule. Lastly, I
provide the soundness and completeness proofs for the system of logic.
2.1 Universal Instantiation in Free Logic
The tableau procedure2 is essentially a test to see whether or not the premises and negated
conclusion of some inference leads to a contradiction (1.5). If the premises and negated
conclusion do lead to a contradiction this indicates that the inference is valid; if the premises
and negated conclusion do not lead to a contradiction this indicates that the inference is
not valid.
A tableau is complete when every rule that can be applied has been applied (1.4.5).
A branch of a tableau closes as soon as there is a contradiction, formulas A and ¬A, on
the branch. Because subsequent steps will not undo the contradiction, the branch may be
closed as soon as the contradiction appears, whether or not all the rules on that branch
have been applied. An ‘X’ at the bottom of a branch is used to indicate closure. A tableau
is closed when every branch on the tableau has been closed (1.4.6).
Most of the rules of Classical Logic tableaux carry over to Free Logic tableaux. They
2Priest explains his choice of the tableau method in the Preface to the First Edition (2008) in the
following way, “constructing tableau proofs, and so ‘getting a feel’ for what is, and is not, valid in logic,
is very easy ... tableaux have great pedagogical attractions” (xviii). Although my rule supports this view,
the aim of this paper is reasonably narrow in scope in adopting this cause and certainly does not go into
anything that could be considered an argument for the tableau method in general.
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are the following (1.4.4):
A ⊃ B ¬(A ⊃ B)
↙↘ ↓
¬A B A
¬B
A ∨B ¬(A ∨B)
↙↘ ↓
A B ¬A
¬B
¬(A ∧B) A ∧B
↙↘ ↓
¬A ¬B A
B
A ≡ B ¬(A ≡ B)
↙↘ ↙↘
A
B
¬A
¬B
A
¬B
¬A
B
¬¬A
↓
A
The following two rules carry over to Free Logic from Classical First Order Logic
(12.4.1):
¬∀xA
↓
∃x¬A
¬∃xA
↓
∀x¬A
The systems of Free Logic dispense with the assumption of Classical Logic that every
object in the domain exists3. This means that constants can refer to non-existent objects.
This allows us to distinguish between something “existing” in the sense of being within the
domain, D, of objects we wish to reason over, and of those objects, “existence proper” in
the sense of being within the sub-domain of objects, E, that we are to say exist.
The division between what exists and what does not exist is relatively straightforward
in Free Logic: certain propositions about Barack Obama, such as, ‘Barack Obama lives
at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue’, are true because of the way the physical world is; certain
propositions about Sherlock Holmes, such as, ‘In the story, Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B
3See Priest 13.8 for a historical overview.
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Baker Street’, are true because of decisions made by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. We will look
at a system that treats more complicated notions of existence in section four.
To express existence and nonexistence, an existence predicate, E, is introduced to the
machinery of classical logic (12.6.2-4). Ea denotes ‘a exists’; ¬Ea denotes ‘a does not exist’.
The truth conditions and rules for Free Logic4 are the same as those of Classical Logic
(above), except for modifications in Universal Instantiation and Particular Instantiation.
In Free Logic, if C is a set of constants such that every object in D has a name in C, then
the truth conditions for the quantifiers are (13.2.6):
v(∀xA) = 1 iff for all c ∈ C such that v(Ec) = 1, v(Ax(c)) = 1 (otherwise it is 0);
v(∃xA) = 1 iff for some c ∈ C such that v(Ec) = 1, v(Ax(c)) = 1 (otherwise it is 0).
This is reflected in Free Logic tableaux by the following rules (13.10.2):
Universal Instantiation Particular Insantiation
∀xA ∃xA
↙↘ ↓
¬Ea Ax(a) E(c)
Ax(c)
The Particular Instantiation Rule for ∃xA introduces some object that exists, represented
by c, a new constant to the branch, which has the property A. The Universal Instantiation
Rule for ∀xA says that either an object does not exist (left branch) or it has the property A
(right branch). The Universal Instantiation Rule is applied for all constants on the branch.
If there is no constant on the branch when the rule is to be instantiated, one is introduced.
In cases where there is a constant, a, predicated by the existence predicate, E, on the
branch before the Universal Instantiation Rule is applied, the left branch of the rule always
closes because the Ea already on the branch contradicts the introduced ¬Ea. In certain
tableaux where this occurs several times, the left branch repeatedly is created only to be
subsequently closed by the contradiction presented. This is seen in the following problem
from Chapter 13 (13.10.2):
4In the chapter on Free Logic, Priest provides rules suitable for Positive Free Logic and Negative Free
Logic (13.4). With the supplementation of the Universal and Particular Instantiation Rules to the rules of
Classical First Order Logic, the system arrives at Positive Free Logic. By adding the Negativity Constraint
Rule to these, the system arrives at Negative Free Logic. This means that the rules I provide here could
apply to either Positive or Negative Free Logic, depending on whether or not one also works with the
Negativity Constraint Rule (13.4.3).
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2.2 Closed Tableaux in Free Logic
A. Closed tableau completed using Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx), ∃xPx |= ∃xQx
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)
∃xPx
¬∃xQx
∀x¬Qx
Ec
Pc
↙↘
¬Ec ¬Qc
X ↙↘
¬Ec Pc ⊃ Qc
X ↙↘
¬Pc Qc
X X
I propose avoiding such series of branches and closures by simplifying the rule: instan-
tiate ∀xA on a branch only if there is already a constant on the branch that refers to
something that is said to exist. In reading an interpretation off the branch, if it is not
explicitly stated in the tableau that an object exists, it is understood that the object does
not exist.5
The Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule6 can be stated as such:
∀xA
Ea
↓
Ax(a)
5This feature will be addressed in detail in section 2.3.
6It may be asserted that although the proposed rule leads to tableaux with fewer branches, Priest’s rule
is “more intuitive”. Talk of intuition in such a case seems to reflect merely the sort of rule one is accustomed
to – a property of the evaluator rather than an objective property of the rule itself. Indeed, it was because
there was something that seemed unintuitive (whatever that means – here taking it to mean what seemed
unnatural to me) about generating multiple branches only to close them immediately after that led to the
proposed rule. However, because of the flimsiness of such claims about intuitiveness I will not assert that
the proposed rule is “more intuitive” and for the same reason I do not think claims that rest on intuition
are persuasive against this proposal.
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a follows the existence predicate, E, on the branch, which means that it refers to an existent
object. In the absence of a constant that follows the existence predicate on the branch,
∀xA is not instantiated.
To demonstrate how this rule would simplify tableaux and to show the contrast between
tableaux created with the two rules, I will first apply the rule to the example above and
will then apply it to a set of formulas that generates a countermodel.
B. Closed tableau from above completed using Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx), ∃xPx |= ∃xQx
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)
∃xPx
¬∃xQx
∀x¬Qx
Ea
Pa
¬Qa
Pa ⊃ Qa
↙↘
¬Pa Qa
X X
Tableau A has 9 lines and branches 3 times; Tableau B has 9 lines and branches once.
2.3 Open Tableaux in Free Logic
I will now apply Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule and the Proposed Universal Instan-
tiation Rule to an example that generates a countermodel.
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C. Open tableau completed using Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx), ∀xPx |= ∃xQx
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)
∀xPx
¬∃xQx
∀x¬Qx
↙↘
¬Ea
↙↘
¬Ea ¬Qa
↙↘ ↙↘
¬Ea Pa ⊃ Qa
↑ ↙↘
¬Pa Qa
¬Ea Pa ⊃ Qa
↙↘
¬Pa Qa
X
Pa
↙↘
¬Ea ¬Qa
↙↘ ↙↘
¬Ea Pa ⊃ Qa
↙↘
¬Pa Qa
¬Ea Pa ⊃ Qa
↙↘
¬Pa Qa
X
In Free Logic, an interpretation is a triple < D,E, v > where the domain, D, is a
non-empty set consisting of all objects, E is the inner domain of D, the set of all existent
objects, and v assigns every formula a truth value. The procedure to read a countermodel
off an open branch in Free Logic is to assign a distinct object, δa, for every constant, a,
that occurs on the branch. The valuation of a predicate, P , is the set of n-tuples assigned
to constants that follow P on the branch (12.4.8). For Priest, if a predicate or constant
does not occur on the branch, it may be assigned any value. Priest calls this the “don’t
care” condition (12.4.8).
Because the domain, D, is a non-empty set, if there is no constant present in the tableau,
an arbitrary object, δ, must be introduced to D when generating the countermodel (14.3.8).
The introduced object will not exist. It may or may not be within the extension of any
predicate other than the existence predicate.
For the countermodel determined by the open branch of tableau C there is a constant,
a, on the branch, so one need not be introduced. The countermodel generated by the
tableau is: D = {δa}, E = {∅}, and v(a) = δa, v(P ) = ∅, v(Q) = ∅. This can be depicted
as:
Countermodel: δa
E X
P X
Q X
Australasian Journal of Logic (12:2) 2015, Article no. 1
104
In the table above, an ‘X’ indicates the object in the column is not in the extension of
the predicate in the row; a check would indicate that the object in the column is in the
extension of the predicate in the row (12.4.8). ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) and ∀xPx are trivially
true because there is no existent object in the domain. ∃xQx is false because there is
not an existent object that has the property Q. The counterexample demonstrates that
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx),∀xPx |= ∃xQx is invalid.
Tableau C completed with the Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule for Free Logic is
as follows.
D. Open tableau completed using Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx), ∀xPx |= ∃xQx
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)
∀xPx
¬∃xQx
∀x¬Qx
↑
The Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule is not applied because the there is no constant
that follows the existence predicate on the branch and the tableau is complete.
As noted above, in the countermodel procedure detailed by Priest, if a predicate is not
on the branch, “the value given to it by v is a don’t care condition: it can be anything
one likes” (12.4.8). That is, on the Priest model of reading a countermodel off tableaux,
if a constant or predicate is not on the branch, it may be said to exist or not exist, to be
satisfied or not satisfied, respectively. However, with tableaux generated using the Proposed
Universal Instantiation Rule this no longer holds. On the model I propose here, predicates
other than the existence predicate continue to fall within the “don’t care” condition, but
existent objects do not. This means that an object is said to exist only if it follows the
existence predicate on the open branch. If an object does not do this, it is understood to
not exist. It is no longer a “don’t care” condition.
The countermodel is generated following a similar procedure as above, except that here
the denotation of a is in the extension of E if and only if Ea is on the branch. That is, if it
is not explicitly stated on the branch that an object is an existent object, the set of existent
objects is taken to be empty. Because formula D is invalid, existence and nonexistence are
easily reflected in the countermodel by including those objects which are stated to exist in
the tableau in the model and excluding those which are not stated to exist in the tableau
from the model.
Generation of the countermodel for Tableau D requires keeping in mind the subtlety
I mentioned above: because there is no constant present in the tableau, when generating
the countermodel, an arbitrary object, denoted by δa, is introduced so that domain D is
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non-empty (14.3.8). δa is not in the extension of E, P or Q. This may be illustrated as
follows and may be verified in the same way as Tableau C.
Countermodel: δa
E X
P X
Q X
Tableau C has 8 lines and branches 11 times; Tableau D has 4 lines and does not
branch. Both executions arrived at the same countermodel. As is demonstrated by this
example executed two different ways, the proposed rule can simplify tableaux.
2.4 Soundness and Completeness in Free Logic
Priest’s Locality Lemma (13.7.2), Denotation Lemma (13.7.3), and Corollary (13.7.4) are
unchanged.
Theorem: The tableaux of free logic are sound with respect to their semantics.
The proof is as in (13.7.5). The only difference in the Soundness Lemma is in the case
of universal instantiation. For universal instantiation, we have the following:
Soundness is proven by demonstrating that, if we assume that on some interpretation,
I, everything on the branch thus far is true, application of the rule in question maintains
truth on at least one of the branches, on some interpretation I ′. The proposed Universal
Instantiation Rule is applied when two conditions are met: ∀xA and Ea are both on the
branch. Consider an interpretation, I, on which, by the Inductive Hypothesis, these two
conditions are met. The truth of ∀xA means that for every object in the inner domain
(every existent object) that object satisfies A. That is, for all d ∈ E Ax(kd) is true. Let
the constant a refer to such a d. Then since Ea is on the branch, d is in the inner domain.
By the Denotation Lemma, Ax(kd) is true in I if and only if Ax(a) is true. Ax(a) is true
in I. Thus, we can take I ′ to be I.
Theorem: The tableaux of free logic are complete with respect to their semantics.
Completeness is proven by demonstrating that for every formula, A, on an open branch,
B
If A is on B then v(A) = 1, and
If ¬A is on B then v(A) = 0.
The open branch, B, induces an interpretation that is defined as follows. Let C be the set
of all constants on B. There are two domains at play: D and E. D consists of every object
that has been named on the branch. D cannot be empty so if there is no constant on the
branch we must introduce a constant that denotes an arbitrary object. The second domain,
E, is the inner domain or class of existent objects. E consists of only those objects on the
branch which are named by some constant, c, that is preceded by the existence predicate,
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E. For the extension of the predicates, if it is not stated on the branch that some predicate
applies to some object, then the object is not in the extension of that predicate.
The only cases that involve the modified rule of universal instantiation are the cases in
the induction for the truth of a universally quantified sentence, and falsity for an existen-
tially quantified sentence. These are as follows.
Suppose that ∀xA is on the branch. We must show that ∀xA is true in the induced
interpretation. Take some object in the domain, d. Let c denote d. If d ∈ E, Ec is on
the branch. Since ∀xA and Ec are on the branch, Ax(c) will also be on the branch. By
the Inductive Hypothesis, v(Ax(c)) = 1. By the Denotation Lemma v(Ax(kd)) = 1. Thus
v(∀xA) = 1.
Suppose that ¬∃xA is on the branch. This means that ∀x¬A is also on the branch.
Reasoning exactly as before, it follows that v(∀x¬A) = 1. And since ∀x¬A is logically
equivalent to ¬∃xA, v(¬∃xA) = 1.
The tableaux of Free Logic are sound and complete with respect to their semantics with
the Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule replacing Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule.
3.1 Universal Instantiation in Variable Domain Modal Logic
With a slight modification, the proposed Universal Instantiation Rule may be carried over
to Variable Domain Modal Logic.
Variable Domain Modal Logic is Free Logic supplemented with the possibility and
necessity operators from Constant Domain Modal Logic.7 As such, the notion of possible
worlds is reflected in Priest’s slight adaptation of his Free Logic Rules. His Variable Domain
Modal Logic Rules is below (15.4.1). A world is given in the rules as i.
Universal Instantiation Particular Instantiation
∀xA, i ∃xA, i
↙↘ ↓
¬Ea, i Ax(a), i Ec, i
Ax(c), i
Application of the branching rule for Universal Instantiation in Variable Domain Modal
Logic often leads to a series of branches and immediate closures if the object, a, is already
on the branch for the world, i. This is similar to the branching demonstrated above in
Free Logic Tableaux A and C. The difference is that in Free Logic, the left branch would
close if the object were anywhere on the branch; whereas with Variable Domain Modal
Logic, the left branch will only close only if the object is on the branch and in the same
world as that for which the rule is applied. Priest 15.4.2 provides an example below. All
Variable Domain Modal Logic tableaux are here done in logic K, meaning that there are
7See Priest 15.10 for a historical overview.
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no constraints on accessibility relations. The proposed technique also extends to stronger
modal logics.
3.2 Closed Tableaux in Variable Domain Modal Logic
E. Closed tableau completed using Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀x(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (∀xA ⊃ ∀xB)
¬(∀x(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (∀xA ⊃ ∀xB)), 0
∀x(A ⊃ B), 0
¬(∀xA ⊃ ∀xB), 0
∀xA, 0
¬∀xB, 0
♦¬∀xB, 0
0r1
¬∀xB, 1
∃x¬B, 1
Ea, 1
¬Bx(a), 1
∀xA, 1
∀x(A ⊃ B), 1
↙ ↘
¬Ea, 1 Ax(a), 1
X ↙ ↘
¬Ea, 1 Ax(a) ⊃ Bx(a), 1
X ↙ ↘
¬Ax(a), 1 Bx(a), 1
X X
Echoing the Free Logic Rule presented above, is the following proposed rule for Uni-
versal Instantiation in Variable Domain Modal Logic:
Universal Instantiation
∀xA, i
Ea, i
↓
Ax(a), i
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Tableau E completed with the Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule for Variable Do-
main Modal Logic goes as follows.
F. Closed tableau completed using Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀x(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (∀xA ⊃ ∀xB)
¬(∀x(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (∀xA ⊃ ∀xB)), 0
∀x(A ⊃ B), 0
¬(∀xA ⊃ ∀xB), 0
∀xA, 0
¬∀xB, 0
♦¬∀xB, 0
0r1
¬∀xB, 1
∃x¬B, 1
Ea, 1
¬Bx(a), 1
∀xA, 1
∀x(A ⊃ B), 1
Ax(a), 1
Ax(a) ⊃ Bx(a), 1
↙ ↘
¬Ax(a), 1 Bx(a), 1
X X
Tableau E has 16 lines and branches 3 times; Tableau F has 16 lines and branches once.
3.3 Open Tableaux in Free Logic
I will now apply Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule and the Proposed Universal Instan-
tiation Rule to a formula that generates a countermodel in Variable Domain Modal Logic.
This example is chosen because it demonstrates how the modification to the Free Logic
Rule I introduced above affects the application of the rule here for Variable Domain Modal
Logic. There is not a dramatic reduction in branches as was seen in Tableaux C and D,
but an example with similarly dramatic results could be constructed.
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G. Open tableau (Barcan Formula) completed using Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀xPx ⊃ ∀xPx
¬(∀xPx ⊃ ∀xPx), 0
∀xPx, 0
¬∀xPx, 0
♦¬∀xPx, 0
0r1
¬∀xPx, 1
∃x¬Px, 1
Ea, 1
¬Pa, 1
↙↘
¬Ea, 0 Pa, 0
↑ Pa, 1
X
A countermodel is read off an open branch of the tableau following the same basic
procedure as above. In Variable Domain Modal Logic, an interpretation is the quadruple
< D,W,R, v > where the domain, D, is the non-empty domain, W is a non-empty set
of worlds, R is a binary accessibility relation on W , and v assigns every formula a truth
value at a world. Thus, for the countermodel determined by the open branch of Tableau G,
W = {w0, w1}, w0Rw1, D = {δa}, v(w0) = Dw0 = vw0(E) = ∅, v(w1) = Dw1 = vw1(E) =
{δa}, vw0(P ) = vw1(P ) = ∅, and v(a) = δa. This can be depicted as:
δa δa
E X w0 −→ w1 E √
P X P X
∀xPx is true at w0 because there are no objects that exist; as such, it is trivially the
case that for every object that exists at w0 that object is P . ∀xPx is false because there
is some world accessible from w0 – w1 – at which there is an existent object and this world
does not have the property P . The countermodel demonstrates that ∀xPx ⊃ ∀xPx is
invalid.
Although it is not the case in this example, if there were no constant introduced in the
tableau, an arbitrary object, δ, would need to be introduced to the domain of D (14.3.8).
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H. Open tableau (Barcan Formula) completed using Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀xPx ⊃ ∀xPx
¬(∀xPx ⊃ ∀xPx), 0
∀xPx, 0
¬∀xPx, 0
♦¬∀xPx, 0
0r1
¬∀xPx, 1
∃x¬Px, 1
Ea, 1
¬Pa, 1
↑
Although the constant a is on the branch, the Universal Instantiation Rule is not
applied because it is not in the same world as the universal quantifier. In the example,
the existent object is in world 1 but ∀xPx is at world 0 and thus the Proposed Universal
Instantiation Rule is not applied. If there had been an existent object at world 0, line 2
could have been instantiated. This aspect of the example highlights this difference between
the rule I introduced above for Free Logic, and the rule I introduce here for Variable Domain
Modal Logic.
The countermodel is generated following the same procedure as above and may be
verified in the same way.
δa δa
E X w0 −→ w1 E √
P X P X
Tableau G has 11 lines and branches 1 time; Tableau H has 9 lines and does not branch.
Both executions arrived at the same countermodel. As is demonstrated by this example
executed two different ways, the proposed rule can greatly simplify tableaux in Variable
Domain Modal Logic.
3.4 Soundness Completeness in Variable Domain Modal Logic
The Locality Lemma (15.9.3) and Denotation Lemma (15.9.4) are unchanged.
Theorem: The tableaux of variable domain K are sound with respect to their semantics.
The proof is as in (15.9.5). The only difference in the Soundness Lemma is in the case
of universal instantiation. For universal instantiation, we have the following:
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Soundness is proven by demonstrating that, if we assume that on some interpretation,
I, everything on the branch thus far is true, application of the rule in question maintains
truth on at least one of the branches, on some interpretation, I ′. Let f be a function that
shows interpretation I to be faithful to the branch. Consider an application of the rule:
∀xA, i
Ea, i
↓
Ax(a), i
Assume that in I ∀xA is true at f(i) and Ea true at f(i). This means that ∀d ∈ Df(i)
and Ax(kd) true at f(i). Let d be such that v(a) = v(kd). Because Ea true at f(i) this
means d ∈ Df(i). This means Ax(kd) is true at f(i). By the Denotation Lemma (15.9.4)
Ax(a) is true at f(i). Hence, I is faithful to the branch, and we can take I
′ to be I.
Theorem: The tableaux of variable domain K are complete with respect to their semantics.
(The proof is as in 15.9.6 with a small modification.)
Completeness is proven by demonstrating that for every formula, A, on an open branch,
B
If A, i is on B then vWi(A) = 1, and
If ¬A, i is on B then vWi(A) = 0.
The open branch, B, induces an interpretation < D,W,R, v > that is defined as follows.
Let C be the set of all constants on the branch. W = {wi : i occurs on B}. wiRwj if and
only if irj occurs on B. D = {δa : a ∈ C} (or if C is empty, D = {δ}, for some arbitrary
δ). For all constants, a, on B, v(a) = δa. For every n-place predicate on B (including E),
< δa1 ..., δan >∈ vWi if and only if Pa1...an, i is on B. DWi = v(wi) = vWi(E) = {δa :
Ea, i occurs on B}. This means δa ∈ DWi if and only if Ea, i is on the branch.
The only cases that involve the modified universal instantiation rule are the cases in the
induction for the truth of the universally quantified sentence, and falsity for an existentially
quantified sentence. These are as follows.
Suppose that ∀xA, i is on the branch. We must show that ∀xA, is true in the induced
interpretation at world wi. This means for ∀d ∈ DWiAx(kd) is true at wi. Suppose that
d ∈ DWi . Let c denote d. Because d ∈ DWi this means that Ec, i, is on B. So, we have
applied the modified universal instantiation rule and Ax(c), i is on B. By the Induction
Hypothesis, Ax(c) is true at wi and Ax(kd) is true at wi by the Denotation Lemma. Thus
vWi(∀xA) = 1.
Suppose that ¬∃xA, i is on the branch. This means that ∀x¬A, i is also on the branch.
Reasoning exactly as before, it follows that vWi(∀x¬A) = 1. And since ∀x¬A, i is logically
equivalent to ¬∃xA, i vWi(¬∃xA) = 1.
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The tableaux of variable domain K are sound and complete with respect to their se-
mantics with the Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule replacing Priest’s Universal In-
stantiation Rule.
4.1 Universal and Particular Instantiation in Intuitionist Logic
The same basic idea may be carried over to Intuitionist Logic, which has two rules each
for Universal and Particular Instantiation – one that branches and one that does not. The
principle I have applied thus far will apply to both Intuitionist Logic rules that involve
branching, for Universal Instantiation, as above, and for Particular Instantiation, for the
first time here.
Intuitionist Logic provides the machinery to account for the sort of questions about
existence and non-existence that I have been discussing, but now considered with respect
to mathematics.8 Something exists in Intuitionist Logic when there is a construction of
it. A new construal of truth and falsity is needed to account for the fact that we are now
working with constructs. This also has repercussions for negation: a proof of ⇁A is a
proof that there is no proof of A (6.2.7). The symbol ⇁ is introduced to capture this new
sense of negation. That is necessary because, in Intuitionist Logic, if there is not a proof
that something is the case, this does not mean that there is a proof that there is no proof
that it is the case. A new notion of the conditional is also required. A proof of A A B is
“a construction that, given any proof of A, can be applied to give a proof of B” (6.2.7).
∀xA is true when for everything that there is or could be a construction of, there is a proof
that it is A. ∃xA is true when there is something that there is a construction of, and there
is a proof that this thing satisfies A.
⇁A in Intuitionism is stronger than falsity (untruth) because it indicates there is a
proof that there is no proof of A. Because in Intuitionism A and ⇁A are not complements,
we can no longer indicate that A is false at a world with ‘⇁A’. Instead, to denote falsity,
the rules for each operator are twofold: one for truth, denoted with a plus sign before the
world, and one for falsity, denoted with a minus sign before the world.
Tableaux of Intuitionist Logic are done in logic Kρτ , meaning that the accessibility
relations, R, are reflexive and transitive, but not symmetric – historically known as S4.
With Variable Domain Modal Logic, the reflexivity relations may be set in any way that
serves the purposes of the proof. With Intuitionist Logic, there are conceptual reasons for
requiring R to be reflexive and transitive. We have transitivity and reflexivity because
once something is proven to be true it cannot be unproven. If something is proven to not
be true in the future that means it was not really true in the past, although it may have
been thought to be so. There is no symmetry because when evidence is found in the future
that proves something to be the case, this does not mean there was evidence that proved
it to be true at that point in the past before it was proven.
8See Priest 6.8 for a historical overview.
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Now that I have explained the motivation for this system of logic, I will explain the
rules Priest gives in the chapter.
We must introduce a line of the form Ea, +0 for every object, a, given in the premises
or conclusion; if there is no constant given in the premises or conclusion, we must introduce
an existent object to world 0 at the beginning of the tableau (20.3.7; 20.4.1).
Every atomic sentence that is true at some world is true at every accessible world (6.3).
This holds true for sentences using the existence predicate, meaning every object that has
been constructed at a world also exists at all accessible worlds. This is captured by the
Heredity Rule (20.4.1):
Pa1...an, +i
irj
↓
Pa1...an, +j
The rules for Universal and Particular Instantiation are as follows (20.4.1):
Universal Instantiation Particular Instantiation
∀xA, +i ∃xA, −i
irj ↙↘
↙↘ Ea, −i Ax(a), −i
Ea, −j Ax(a), +j
∀xA, −i ∃xA, +i
↓ ↓
irj Ec, +i
Ec, +j Ax(c), +i
Ax(c), −j
Application of this set of rules often leads to a series of branches and swift closures
if the object, a, is already on the branch for the world, i, or if the heredity rule can be
applied to close the branch. This looks similar to the branching demonstrated above in
Free Logic Tableaux A and C and Variable Domain Modal Logic Tableaux D and F. Priest
20.4.2 provides such an example below.
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4.2 Closed Tableaux in Intuitionist Logic
I. Closed tableau completed using Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule:
∀xPx A Pa
Ea, +0
∀xPx A Pa, −0
0r0
0r1, 1r1
∀xPx, +1
Pa, −1
↙↘
Ea, −1 Pa, +1
Ea, +1 X
X
The branching that was seen with the rules for Free and Variable Domain Modal Logic
is exacerbated with this set of rules because now there is also a branching rule for the
particular quantifier. Priest writes that the resulting tableaux are “perspicuous, but can
be unwieldy, due to the branching delivered by the second pair of quantifier rules” (20.5)
and names this sort of tableaux tableaux of kind 1.
Priest proposes tableaux of kind 2 that require “extra book-keeping” but that simplify
tableaux by eliminating the existence predicate, requiring instead information which is on
the tableau, but only implicitly. He proposes replacing the rules above with the following
(20.5.4):
Universal Instantiation Particular Instantiation
∀xA, +i ∃xA, −i
irj ↓
↓ Ax(a), −i
Ax(a), +j
∀xA, −i ∃xA, +i
↓ ↓
irj Ax(c), +i
Ax(c), −j
For the top particular instantiation rule the object a must “belong to” i and for the
top universal instantiation rule, the object a must “belong to” j (20.5.3). For an object
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to “belong to” a world that means it exists at that world. As one applies these rules, one
must use information implicit on the branch, as it is not explicitly visible anywhere on the
branch. Tableaux of this form are less unwieldy than those of kind 1 but they are less
perspicuous.
I propose a revised version of these rules in the model of those I have presented above.
It has the reduction in branches of tableaux of kind 2 and the perspicuity of tableaux of
kind 1. These rules essentially spell out what was kept in ones head in tableaux of kind
2. In this rule Ea, i indicates a belongs to i. I propose the following rules for Intuitionist
Logic to replace the current branching rules of tableaux of kind 1 and the top rules of
tableaux of kind 2:
Universal Instantiation Particular Instantiation
∀xA, +i ∃xA, +i
irj Ec + i
Ea + j ↓
↓ Ax(c), +i
Ax(a), +j
Because it is a requirement of this rule that there exists an object in the relevant domain
for the rule to be applied, it is advisable to apply the Heredity Rule as soon as there is a
new variable or world to apply it to.
Tableau I completed with the Proposed Universal Instantiation Rule for Intuitionist
Logic goes as follows.
J. Closed tableau completed using Proposed Rules:
∀xPx A Pa
Ea, +0
∀xPx A Pa, −0
0r0
0r1, 1r1
Ea, +1
∀xPx, +1
Pa, −1
Pa + 1
X
Tableau I has 8 lines and branches once; Tableau J has 8 lines and does not branch.
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4.3 Open Tableaux in Intuitionist Logic
K. Open tableau completed using Priest’s False Particular Instantiation Rule (20.4.2):
∃x(Px ∨⇁Px)
Ec, +0
∃x(Px ∨⇁Px), −0
0r0
↙ ↘
Ec, −0 Pc ∨⇁Pc, −0
X Pc, −0
⇁Pc, −0
0r1, 1r1
Pc, +1
Ec, +1
↑
To read a countermodel off the open branch, we will use the basic structure as above
to account for the quantifiers, supplemented with the methods of propositional Intuitionist
Logic (6.4.8). If the branch states that some node is true at some world, it is indicated as
true in the countermodel. If some node is stated to be false at some world, it is indicated
as false in the countermodel. The countermodel given by the open branch of tableau
K, W = {w0, w1}, w0Rw0, w0Rw1, w1Rw1, D = {δc}, v(w0) = Dw0 = v(w0)(E) =
{δc}, v(w1) = Dw1 = vw1(E) = {δc}, vw0(P ) = ∅, vw1(P ) = {δc}, and v(c) = δc . This
can be depicted as:
δc δc
x x
E
√
w0 −→ w1 E √
P X P
√
Recall that ⇁Px means that there is a proof that there is no proof that Px. ⇁Px
fails at w0 because Pc holds at w1 as given in the right side of the model and thus there
can be no proof that there is no proof that Px. Px also fails at w0 as given in the left
side of the model. Thus, for c, it is not the case that it either is Pc or ⇁Pc. c is the only
object in the model. Thus, the countermodel demonstrates that ∃x(Px ∨⇁Px) is invalid.
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L. Open tableau completed using Proposed False Particular Instantiation Rule (20.4.2):
∃x(Px ∨⇁Px)
Ec, +0
∃x(Px ∨⇁Px), −0
0r0
Pc ∨⇁Pc, −0
Pc, −0
⇁Pc, −0
0r1, 1r1
Pc, +1
Ec, +1
↑
The countermodel is generated following the same procedure as above and may be
verified in the same way.
δc δc
x x
E
√
w0 −→ w1 E √
P X P
√
Tableau K has 9 lines and branches once; Tableau L has 9 lines and does not branch.
Both executions arrived at the same countermodel. As is demonstrated by this example
executed two different ways, the proposed rules can simplify tableaux in Intuitionist Logic
and eliminate the need to have two types of rules in the chapter. The proposed rules result
in Intuitionistic Logic tableaux that are both perspicuous and not unwieldy.
4.4 Soundness and Completeness in Intuitionist Logic
The Locality Lemma (20.9.2) and Denotation Lemma (20.9.3) are unchanged.
Theorem: The tableaux of Intuitionist Logic are sound with respect to their semantics.
The proof is as in 20.9.5. The only differences in the Soundness Lemma are in the cases
for truth in Universal Instantiation and falsity in Particular Instantiation.
Soundness is proven by demonstrating that, if we assume that on some interpretation,
I, everything on the branch thus far is true, application of the rule in question maintains
truth on at least one of the branches, on some interpretation, I ′.
We have two rules to consider. For truth in the case of Universal Instantiation we have
the following:
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Let f be a function that shows interpretation I to be faithful to the branch, that is, f
is a function from numbers to worlds that indicates which world in an interpretation each
number is referring to (2.9.2). Consider an application of the rule:
(i) ∀xA, +i
irj
Ea, +j
↓
Ax(a), +j
Assume that in I ∀xA is true at f(i) and Ea true at f(j) when f(i)Rf(j). This means
that for ∀d ∈ Df(j) Ax(kd) is true at f(j). Let d be such that v(a) = v(kd). Because Ea is
true at f(j) this means d ∈ Df(j). This means Ax(kd) is true at f(j). By the Denotation
Lemma (20.9.3) Ax(a) is true at f(j). Hence, I is faithful to the branch, and we can take
I ′ to be I.
For the falsity case of Particular Instantiation we have the following:
Let f be a function that shows interpretation I to be faithful to the branch. Consider
an application of the rule:
(ii) ∃xA, −i
Ea, +i
↓
Ax(a), −i
Assume that in I ∃xA is false at f(i) and Ea true at f(i). This means that for ∀d ∈ D, f(i)
Ax(kd) is false at f(i). Let d be such that v(a) = v(kd). Because Ea true at f(i) this means
d ∈ Df(i). This means Ax(kd) is false at f(i). By the Denotation Lemma (20.9.3) Ax(a) is
false at f(i). Hence, I is faithful to the branch, and we can take I ′ to be I.
Theorem: The tableaux of Intuitionist Logic are complete with respect to their semantics.
Completeness is proven by demonstrating that for every formula, A, on an open branch,
B
If A, +i is on B then vwi(A) = 1, and
If A, −i is on B then vwi(A) = 0.
The open branch, B, induces an interpretation < D,W,R, v > that is defined as follows.
Let C be the set of all constants on the branch. W = {wi : i occurs on B}. wiRwj if and
only if irj occurs on B. D = {δa : a ∈ C}. For all constants, a, on B, v(a) = δa. For every
n-place predicate on B (including E), < δa1 , ..., δan >∈ vwi if and only if Pa1...an, +i is
on B. Dwi = v(wi) = vwi(E) = {δa : Ea, i occurs on B}. This means δa ∈ Dwi if and only
if Ea, i is on the branch.
The argument is as in 20.9.8. There are only two differences: the plus case for Universal
Instantiation and minus case for Existential Instantiation.
Australasian Journal of Logic (12:2) 2015, Article no. 1
119
For the first of these, we have the following: suppose that ∀xA, +i is on the branch.
We must show that ∀xA is true at wi in the induced interpretation. This means that for
all j such that irj d ∈ Dwj Ax(kd) is true at wj . Suppose that d ∈ Dwj . Let c denote
d. Because d ∈ Dwj this means that Ec, +j, is on B. So, we have applied the modified
universal instantiation rule and Ax(c), +j, is on B. By Induction Hypothesis, Ax(c) is true
at wj and Ax(kd) is true at wj by the Denotation Lemma. Thus vwi(∀xA) = 1.
For the second case: suppose that ∃xA, −i is on the branch. We must show that
∃xA is false at wi in the induced interpretation. This means that for every c such that
d ∈ Dwi Ax(kd) is false at wi. Suppose that d ∈ Dwi . Let c denote d. Because d ∈ Dwi
this means that Ec, +i, is on B. So, we have applied the modified particular instantiation
rule and Ax(c), −i, is on B. By Induction Hypothesis, Ax(c) is false at wi and Ax(kd) is
false at wi by the Denotation Lemma. Thus vwi(∃xA) = 0.
The tableaux of Intuitionist Logic are sound and complete with respect to their seman-
tics with the proposed True Universal Instantiation and False Particular Instantiation rules
replacing Priest’s True Universal Instantiation and False Particular Instantiation rules.
5. Concluding Remarks
In the 12 examples provided, the proposed rule reduced the total lines of proofs by 6 and
the total number of branches by 18. With Priest’s rule, it was often the case that a left
branch was created only to be quickly closed. This is remedied by applying the proposed
rule instead: the universal quantifier is instantiated only if an existent object is present in
the relevant world, if applicable.
To conclude I will point out a way in which the proposed rule is similar in principle to
a more familiar rule. In Priest’s Universal Instantiation Rule there is a disanalogy between
Px and ∀x; this analogy is restored with the proposed rules. There are a number of
parallels between the rules for Px and ♦Px and for ∀x and ∃x, respectively. For ♦Px
and ∃x something new is introduced when the rule is applied: if ♦Px is on the branch,
we introduce a world; if ∃x is on the branch, we introduce a constant. If Px is on the
branch, we are not at liberty to introduce a world at which this holds because Px is
“trivially” true when there is no world; the rule is applied only to worlds already present
on the branch. In Priest’s rule for ∀xPx, we were at liberty to introduce a constant which
made Px true even when there was no existing constant present on the branch. Now, for
Px and ∀x, application of the rule is limited to what we already have: we apply Px
to every world on the branch; we apply ∀xPx to every constant on the branch. If there
is no existent object, ∀xPx is “trivially” true. Requiring an existent constant to be on
the branch before application of the ∀x rule is similar in principle to requiring a world to
exist before application of the Px rule. For purposes of reading a countermodel off the
branch, it is not assumed that there is an accessible world beyond w0 if it is not explicitly
stated on the branch. Similarly, with the proposed rules, it is not assumed that the object
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in the domain exists if it is not explicitly stated to exist on the branch. In these ways, the
similarity in treatment and explanation of ∀x and Px is restored.
The proposed rules can greatly simplify tableaux and could be used beneficially in place
of the rules for universal instantiation introduced by Priest in the chapters on Free Logic
and Variable Domain Modal Logic, and for truth of universal instantiation and falsity of
particular instantiation in the chapter on Intuitionist Logic.
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